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Industrial Policy and Competition†
By Philippe Aghion, Jing Cai, Mathias Dewatripont, Luosha Du,
Ann Harrison, and Patrick Legros*
Using a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises
in China between 1998 and 2007, we show that industrial policies
allocated to competitive sectors or that foster competition in a
sector increase productivity growth. We measure competition using
the Lerner Index and include as industrial policies subsidies tax
holidays, loans, and tariffs. Measures to foster competition include
policies that are more dispersed across firms in a sector or measures
that encourage younger and more productive enterprises. (JEL L11,
L25, L52, O14, O25, O47, P31)

I

n the aftermath of World War II, several developing countries opted for “industrial policies” aimed at promoting new infant industries or at protecting local
traditional activities from competition by products from more advanced countries.
However, these policies came into disrepute in the 1980s mainly on the grounds that
industrial policy prevents competition and allows governments to pick winners (and,
more rarely, to name losers) in a discretionary fashion, thereby increasing the scope
for capture of governments by vested interests.
In this paper, we argue that properly governed sectoral policies, in particular sectoral policies that are competition-friendly, may enhance productivity and productivity growth. Without industrial policy, innovative firms may choose to operate in
different sectors in order to face lower competition on the product market, leading to
high sectoral concentration and low incentives to innovate because of a “monopoly
replacement effect.” In such a case, industrial policies that encourage firms to be
active in the same sector, such as through tax holidays or other tax subsidy schemes,
will decrease concentration in the targeted sector and enhance incentives for firms to
innovate. Therefore there can be complementarity between competition and suitably
designed industrial policies in inducing innovation and productivity growth.
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To document the potential complementarity between competition and industrial
policy, we use a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises in China
between 1998 and 2007 and consider the effect of industrial policies on firm-level
productivity growth. Our main finding is that when sectoral policies are targeted
toward competitive sectors or allocated in such a way as to preserve or increase
competition, then these policies increase productivity growth. We measure competition using the Lerner Index and include as industrial policies subsidies, tax holidays,
loans, and tariffs. Competition-friendly policies are defined as targeting that is more
dispersed across firms in a sector or measures that encourage younger and more
productive enterprises.
Our paper relates to a whole literature on the costs and benefits of industrial policy. First are the infant-industry models advocating government support to sectors
with potential economy-wide knowledge externalities, but with high initial production costs that decrease only progressively over time as a result of learning-by-doing:
the idea is that these sectors need to be protected against foreign competition in the
short run until they become fully competitive (see, for example, Greenwald and
Stiglitz 2006).1 The infant industry argument has been challenged, both theoretically (the “pick-winners” argument) and empirically. For example, Krueger and
Tuncer (1984) analyzed the effects of industrial policy in Turkey in the 1960s, and
“showed” that firms or industries not protected by tariff measures were characterized by higher productivity in growth rates than protected industries.2 However,
none of these papers look at the design or at the governance of industrial policy.
Most closely related to our analysis is the paper by Nunn and Trefler (2010).
Using cross-country, industry-level panel data, they analyze whether, as suggested
by “infant industry” arguments, the growth of productivity in a country is positively affected by tariff protection biased in favor of activities and sectors that are
“skill-intensive,” that is to say, use more intensely skilled workers. They find a significant positive correlation between productivity growth and the “skill bias” due
to tariff protection. As the authors point out though, such a correlation does not
necessarily mean there is causality between skill bias due to protection and productivity growth: the two variables may themselves be the result of a third factor, such
as the quality of institutions in countries considered. However, Nunn and Trefler
(2010) show that at least 25 percent of the correlation corresponds to a causal effect.
Overall, their analysis suggests that adequately designed (here, skill-intensive) targeting may actually enhance growth, not only in the sector that is being subsidized,
but in other sectors as well. The issue remains whether industrial policy comes at the
For an overview of infant industry models and empirical evidence, see Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2009).
The infant industry argument could be summarized as follows. Consider a local economy that includes both a traditional sector (especially agriculture) and an industry in its infancy. Production costs in industry are initially high,
but “learning by doing” decrease these costs over time, even faster as the volume of activity in this area is high. In
addition, increased productivity, which is a consequence of this learning by doing phase, has positive spillovers on
the rest of the economy, i.e., it increases the potential rate of growth also in the traditional sector. In this case, a total
and instantaneous liberalization of international trade can be detrimental to the growth of the local economy, as it
might inhibit the activity of the local industry whose production costs are initially high: what will happen in this
case is that the local demand for industrial products will turn to foreign importers. It means that learning by doing
in the local industry will be slowed itself, which will reduce the externalities of growth from this sector towards the
traditional sector.
2
However, see Harrison (1994) who shows that their results are not robust to rigorous statistical analysis.
1
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cost of a lowering of competition, e.g., between high and low skill-intensive sectors
or within a high-skill sector. As we show in this paper, industrial policy in the form
of targeting may in fact take the form of enhancing competition in a sector, and
serves the dual role of increasing consumer surplus and growth.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we sketch a simple model to guide
our empirical analysis.3 In Section II we present some brief historical background
for industrial policy in China, as well as the data and measurement and some raw
correlations between competition, industrial policies, and firm level performance.
We describe in Section III the estimation methodology and presents the main empirical results. We conclude in Section IV.
I. The Theoretical Argument

In this section, we sketch our theoretical argument for why properly designed
sectoral policy may enhance rather than harm competition. The argument can be
summarized as follows: consider an economy where two firms can either differentiate horizontally or innovate to improve their productivity. Under laissez-faire the
two firms will typically choose to diversify, i.e., to produce in different sectors in
order to escape competition between them. Forcing (or encouraging) these firms
to operate in the same sector and on an equal footing will induce them to resort to
vertical innovation (i.e., to productivity-improving innovation) in order to escape
competition with each other. This in turn will foster productivity growth.
Note that this argument is quite distinct from the infant-industry argument and
is also novel in the literature on the effects of industrial policy. In particular it does
not rely on learning-by-doing externalities or on knowledge externalities between
an industrial (tradable good) sector and a traditional (non-tradable good) sector.
Instead, it relies on standard growth externalities and on an escape-competition
effect (see, for instance, Aghion et al. 2005). Thus, while (foreign) competition
is damaging for domestic growth in the infant-industry model, here competition is
always growth-enhancing.
A. Basic Setup
We consider a two-period model of an economy producing two goods, denoted
by Aand B
 . Denote the quantity consumed on each good by x   Aand x   B. The representative consumer has income equal to 2Eand utility log (x  A) +  log (x  B) when
consuming x  Aand x  B. This means that if the price of good iis p  i , demand for good i
will be x  i  = E/p  i.To simplify the writing, we assume that E = 1throughout this
paper.4
Production can be done by one of two “big” firms 1 , 2,or by “fringe firms.”
Fringe firms act competitively and have a constant marginal cost of production of
cf, whereas firms j = 1, 2have an initial marginal cost of c   , where 1 > cf  ≥ c .
3

The details of the model as well as the proofs are developed in Appendix B.
As soon will be apparent, the rate of innovation is linear in E , and except for this size effect, what matters for
the analysis are the ratios E
 /cand E/cf .
4

4
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The assumption c f  ≥ creflects the cost advantage of firms 1 , 2with respect to the
fringe, and the assumption 1 > censures that equilibrium quantities can be greater
than 1. Marginal costs are firm-specific and are independent of the sector in which
production is undertaken.
Firms can improve productivity through quality-improving innovation. For simplicity, we assume that only firms 1, 2can innovate. Innovation reduces production
costs, but the size of the cost reduction is different between the two sectors A
 and B
 .
Without loss of generality, we assume that in sector A,innovations reduce production costs from cto c/γA   = c/(γ + δ),whereas in sector Bthey reduce costs from
 − δ > 1or δ < γ − 1.5
cto c/γB  = c/(γ − δ),where γ
We also make the simple assumption that, with equal probability, each firm can
be chosen to be the potential innovator. To innovate with probability q this firm must
incur effort cost q   2/2. This is like saying that each firm has an exogenous probability of getting a patentable idea, which then has to be turned into cost reduction
thanks to effort exerted by the firm.
Finally, we assume Bertrand competition within each sector unless the two leading firms choose the same sector and collude within that sector. Let φbe the probability of the two leading firms colluding in the same sector when they have the
same cost, and let us assume that when colluding the two firms behave as a joint
monopoly taking the fringe cost c fas given. In this case, the expected profit of each
cf  − c

leading firm with cost c < cfis φ
  _12   ____
cf since, when collusion fails, firms compete
Bertrand.
B. The Effects of Targeted Tax/Subsidies

Firms can choose to be active in different sectors or in the same sector: we refer
to the first situation as one of diversity, and the second as one of focus. Under focus,
both firms choose the better technology A
 . Under diversity, one firm (call it firm 1)
chooses Aand the other (call it firm 2) chooses B
  (this is a coordination game and
which firm ends up with technology Ais random). Diversity is stable if the firm
ending up with technology B
 does not want to switch to technology A
 ; otherwise the
equilibrium is focus. Conditional on this choice firms then decide to invest in order
to innovate.
We look at how firms’ choices whether to produce in the same sector or in different sectors, and their resulting innovation intensities, depend upon industrial policy.
For industrial policy we will focus on interventions based on taxes or subsidies that
are proportional to profit levels, that is, on tax levels tA , tB per profit level in sectors A, B, respectively, where tk  < 0is a subsidy and tk  > 0is a tax.6 We restrict

5
Even if δ = 0 , that is, if the two sectors are similar, industrial policy is beneficial. In previous versions of
the paper we considered imperfect information about the identity of the high growth sector, and our results were
qualitatively similar. This suggests that a regulator does not need necessarily to identify the “high growth” sector in
order to implement the type of industrial policy we are considering.
6
We assume without loss of generality an initial level of taxation equal to zero in each sector.
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a ttention to the case where there is perfect information about γi and where the profit
is net of the cost of innovation.7
We first derive the equilibrium choices under arbitrary tax/subsidy schemes
tA  ≤ tB (“laissez-faire” corresponds to the case tA   = tB  = 0),and show the
interaction between our measure of competition φand the growth rate that can be
achieved via such a tax system. We then identify the growth-maximizing tax/subsidy scheme when the planner is subject to a budget constraint.
Considering the laissez-faire situation with tA   = tB  = 0 , firms will choose
focus only if the equilibrium profit is greater than the lowest profit obtained under
diversity. This will be the case only if the degree of competition is not too high;
hence, the stronger competition as measured by (1 − φ), the higher the range of δ   s
for which firms will choose diversity.
 ,
Proposition 1: There exists a cutoff value δ  F(φ), a decreasing function of φ
such that focus is the industry equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ δ  F(φ).
Now, let us introduce a system of tax/subsidies, and let us use as a measure of
targeting the ratio
1 − t 
(1)	
τ ≡  _____A   .
1 − tB 
The larger τis, the higher are the “tax holidays” in sector Awith respect to sector B.
It should be clear that τis sufficient to characterize the incentives of firms to choose
between diversity or focus. Alternatively, τ is a measure of the asymmetry in tax
holidays between the two sectors. The effect of the tax ratio on industry equilibrium
is summarized in the following result.
Corollary 1: Consider a system of tax/subsidies with a targeting ratio
1 − tA 
. When τ > 1, there exists a cutoff Δ(φ, τ) < δ  F(φ),such that the
τ =  ____
1 − t 
B

firms choose focus in equilibrium whenever δ > Δ(φ, τ).Moreover this cutoff is
decreasing in τand in φ
 .

Hence, a larger target ratio τ increases the range of values of δ for which there
will be focus. Alternatively, if δ < δ  F(φ) , there exists a targeting tax τ , such that
δ = Δ(φ, τ); because Δ
 (φ, τ)is a decreasing function of τ  , the lower the value of
δ , the higher this value of τshould be.
Now solving for the optimal innovation investments, respectively under focus
and under diversity, we obtain the complementarity between the degree of competition in a sector and the effectiveness of a tax/subsidy scheme.

7
If the tax/subsidy is on the profit gross of the cost of innovation, then it will also affect the rate at which
firms innovate. A reduction in the tax rate on gross profits has a similar effect as a subsidy to the marginal cost of
innovation.
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Proposition 2: An effective τ -industrial policy has a bigger effect on per capita
GDP and on innovation intensity in more competitive industries.
C. Predictions
The following predictions from the above theoretical discussion will guide our
empirical analysis in the next sections:
• A tax policy that is more targeted toward sector Ahas a bigger impact on output
and innovation: a higher value of τ (that is a lower tA with respect to tB) makes
it more likely that focus will be the industry equilibrium. By Proposition 2, it
follows that higher values of τ have a larger effect on innovation and on the
level of per capita GDP, independently of φ.
• Since a policy that gives a tax holiday to only one firm will not modify the
industry equilibrium, tax holidays that are common to the two firms have a
bigger impact on innovation and the level of per capita GDP than a policy that
would apply to a unique firm.
• There is complementarity between industrial policy through tax holidays and
the degree of competition.
II. Background, Data, and Measurement

A. Background
The Chinese government has long been actively involved in promoting industrialization in China. Industrial policy relies on a whole range of instruments, including
tariff protection, low interest loans, tax holidays, and subsidies for the purpose of
promoting investment in key sectors. We begin by documenting the range of industrial policies and their changes over the sample period. Readers interested in more
detailed descriptions of China’s changing industrial policies over the sample period
are referred to Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2014) or Harrison (2014).
The first row of Table 1 reports the percentage of firms that received positive
subsidies from the government. In 1998, 9.4 percent of all reporting firms received
subsidies. That number climbed steadily during the sample period, reaching a high
of 15.1 percent of all manufacturing firms in 2004, before falling to 12.4 percent
in 2007. The number was even higher for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign firms (many of which formed joint ventures with SOEs), but lower for domestic firms with no public or foreign participation. For private domestic enterprises
(“Domestic Private Only” in Table 1), the share of firms receiving subsidies was
slightly lower, increasing from 8 percent of all firms in 1998 to a high of 13.8 percent in 2004, before falling to 11.6 percent in 2007.
The second row of Table 1 indicates the percentage of firms receiving tax holidays over the sample period. We define a firm as receiving a tax holiday if either
the firm paid less than the statutory corporate income tax rate in that year or if the
firm paid less than the statutory value-added tax rate. A large share of manufacturing
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Table 1—Summary Statistics

All companies
Percent of firms with subsidies
Percent of firms with tax holidays
Ratio of interest payments to
  current liabilities
Average tariff on imports
SOEs only
Percent of firms with subsidies
Percent of firms with tax holidays
Ratio of interest payments to
  current liabilities
Average tariff on imports
Foreign firms only
Percent of firms with subsidies
Percent of firms with tax holidays
Ratio of interest payments to
  current liabilities
Average tariff on imports
Domestic private firms only
Percent of firms with subsidies
Percent of firms with tax holidays
Ratio of interest payments to
  current liabilities
Average tariff on imports

1998

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2007

0.0937
0.416
0.0557

0.110
0.453
0.0413

0.115
0.441
0.0366

0.129
0.443
0.0340

0.138
0.456
0.0319

0.151
0.419
0.0268

0.137
0.454
0.0313

0.124
0.497
0.0330

19.48

18.68

13.84

13.58

12.23

10.91

10.17

10.12

0.139
0.306
0.0416

0.162
0.355
0.0288

0.171
0.334
0.0255

0.181
0.343
0.0238

0.197
0.365
0.0222

0.197
0.337
0.0184

0.224
0.367
0.0183

0.253
0.455
0.0200

19.81

19.11

13.76

13.48

12.05

11.01

10.24

10.24

0.0678
0.540
0.0408

0.0839
0.591
0.0282

0.103
0.572
0.0249

0.133
0.585
0.0219

0.154
0.593
0.0198

0.181
0.577
0.0164

0.146
0.598
0.0185

0.142
0.608
0.0198

21.29

19.83

14.65

14.41

12.99

11.45

10.68

10.45

0.0835
0.418
0.0668

0.105
0.431
0.0491

0.107
0.417
0.0424

0.119
0.412
0.0391

0.126
0.421
0.0365

0.138
0.374
0.0304

0.131
0.413
0.0356

0.116
0.467
0.0368

18.65

18.14

13.58

13.33

12.00

10.74

10.00

10.02

firms paid less than the full statutory rate during the sample period. The share of
enterprises with tax holidays varies from 41.6 percent in 1998 to nearly 50 percent
in 2007. Comparing the incidence of tax holidays across different types of enterprises, Table 1 shows that the incidence was lowest for SOEs and highest for firms
with foreign equity participation. Up to 59 percent of foreign firms received some
type of tax holiday in 2003, compared to only 36.5 percent for SOEs.
While low interest loans have been an important form of industrial policy in
China, we do not have data on directed credit provided through state banks or local
governments. However, firms do report total interest and current liabilities, so we
can calculate an effective interest rate on loan obligations. We report those averages
in the third row of Table 1. The average ratio of interest paid to current liabilities
across all firms with nonzero interest or liabilities was 5.57 percent in 1998. The
interest ratio steadily declined during the sample period, to a low of 2.7 percent in
2004, and then increased to 3.3 percent in 2007. Across different ownership categories, there was significant variation, with domestic private enterprises facing an
effective interest rate that was almost double that faced by SOEs.
In the last row of Table 1 we report the average tariff on imports by year for 1998
through 2007. Since tariffs are set nationally by sector, there is not significant variation in tariffs across enterprise types. During the sample period, average tariffs came
down dramatically, from an average of 20 percentage points in 1998 to an average of
10 percentage points in 2007. By contrast, average tariffs in the United States over
the last several decades have been less than 5 percent. The largest drop in tariffs
occurred in 2001, the year China joined the WTO.

8
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Table 2—Industrial Policies by Sector
Sector

Interest rate

Foodstuff
Manufacture of beverages
Manufacture of tobacco
Manufacture of textiles
Manufacture of textile wearing apparel, footwear
Manufacture of leather, fur
Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo
Manufacture of furniture
Manufacture of paper and paper products
Manufacture of articles for culture, education, and
sport activity
Processing of petroleum, coking, processing of
nuclear fuel
Manufacture of raw chemical materials and
chemical products
Manufacture of medicines
Manufacture of chemical fibers
Manufacture of rubber
Manufacture of plastics
Manufacture of nonmetallic mineral products
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals
Smelting and pressing of metals
Manufacture of metal products
Manufacture of special purpose machinery
Manufacture of transport equipment
Manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment
Manufacture of communication equipment,
computers, and other electronic equipment
Manufacture of measuring instruments and
machinery for cultural activity and office work
Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing

Tariff

Subsidies

0.0424
0.0441
0.0336
0.0357
0.0256
0.0308
0.0578
0.0397
0.0438
0.0230

21.67
27.48
52.28
14.39
20.32
18.17
7.557
8.776
10.60
11.99

0.109
0.106
0.229
0.120
0.101
0.0959
0.114
0.0923
0.105
0.126

0.476
0.451
0.320
0.444
0.492
0.486
0.548
0.501
0.454
0.474

0.0391

6.046

0.106

0.388

0.0391

9.513

0.145

0.452

0.0391
0.0381
0.0376
0.0323
0.0462
0.0367
0.0397
0.0293
0.0288
0.0289
0.0266
0.0182

6.148
8.743
15.66
11.45
12.38
6.193
5.602
12.15
9.112
17.57
11.67
7.081

0.166
0.166
0.116
0.107
0.139
0.109
0.160
0.107
0.138
0.150
0.144
0.155

0.468
0.426
0.455
0.451
0.445
0.413
0.433
0.432
0.419
0.413
0.423
0.538

0.0205

9.442

0.170

0.470

0.102

0.485

0.0344

17.03

Tax holidays

Table 2 reports average industrial policies across two-digit manufacturing sectors
between 1998 and 2007. There was significant variation in the intensity of industrial policy across different subsectors. For example, the ratio of interest payments
to current liabilities, our proxy for the (subsidized) interest rate facing the enterprise, was very low for the computer and telecommunications sector, averaging 1.8
percent, but significantly higher for nonmetallic minerals (4.6 percent), beverages
(4.4 percent), and paper products (4.4 percent). Tariffs also show significant dispersion, with the highest tariffs on goods such as tobacco products (over 52 percent)
and transport equipment (17 percent) and the lowest tariffs on wood products (7.6
percent) and fuels (6 percent). The percentage of firms receiving subsidies and tax
holidays also varied across sectors, as reported in the last two columns of Table 2.
B. Data and Measurement
We measure industrial policy using four types of policy instruments: subsidies,
interest paid as a share of current liabilities, tax holidays, and tariffs. Subsidies,
interest payments, and tax holidays are allocated at the firm level, while tariffs are
set at the national level. Our data for tariffs are available at the two or three digit
level. Tariffs are set nationally and are exogenous with respect to a particular region
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or a particular firm. However, since tariffs do not vary across firms, we cannot use
measures of policy dispersion within a sector to test whether tariffs are set in a
way that preserves competition. For tariffs, all we can do is test whether the imposition of tariffs in more competitive sectors is more likely to result in higher firm
performance.
To measure competition, we will compute a Lerner Index at both the county and
sector level. The Lerner Index measures the importance of markups (the difference
between prices and marginal costs) relative to the firm’s total value-added. To calculate it, we first aggregate operating profits, capital costs, and sales at the industry,
county, and year level. The Lerner Index is defined as the ratio of operating profits
less capital costs to sales. Under perfect competition, there should be no excess
profits above capital costs, so the Lerner Index should equal zero. Since the Lerner
Index is an inverse measure of competition, we redefine competition as 1–Lerner, so
under perfect competition it should equal 1 . A value of 1 indicates perfect competition, while values below 1suggest some degree of market power. We address the
potential endogeneity of competition using initial period Lerners in all the estimating equations below.
The standard approach to measuring firm-level performance is to identify total
factor productivity (TFP) levels or growth. Since TFP is an overall efficiency parameter, it is best understood as measuring process innovation—the cost reduction
associated with improving the efficiency in producing an existing product. Another
measure of innovation is product innovation—associated with the introduction of
new products or higher quality goods. Our primary focus is on process innovation,
since product innovation is not reliably measured and was also less pervasive for
firms in the sample during this period.
The dataset, collected by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, is described
in greater detail in Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2012). We retain only the manufacturing enterprises and eliminate establishments with missing values or negative
or zero values for key variables such as output, employees, capital, and inputs. The
years covered include 1998 through 2007. This is a true panel, following the same
firms over time. We dropped three sectors with incomplete information on prices
from the sample.8 The final sample size is 1,545,626observations.
The dataset contains information on real and nominal output, assets, number of
workers, renumeration, inputs, public ownership, foreign investment, sales revenue,
and exports. Because domestically owned, foreign, and publicly owned enterprises
behave quite differently, in all the regression results presented below we will restrict
the sample to firms that have zero foreign ownership and have only minority state
ownership. In the dataset, 1 ,069,563observations meet the criterion.9
To control for the effects of trade policies, we have created a time series of tariffs,
obtained from the World Integrated Trading Solution (WITS), maintained by the
World Bank. We aggregated tariffs to the same level of aggregation as the foreign
8
They are the following sectors: processing food from agricultural products; printing, reproduction of recording
media; and general purpose machinery.
9
Typically we distinguish domestic and foreign-invested firms based on whether the share of subscribed capital
owned by foreign investors is equal to or less than 10 percent. The results are generally robust to the choice of
definition for foreign versus domestic ownership.
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investment data, using output for 2 003as weights. During the sample period, average tariffs fell by nearly 9 percentage points, which is a significant change over a
short time period. While the average level of tariffs across all years was nearly 1 3
percent, this average masks significant heterogeneity across sectors, with a high of
41percent in grain mill products and a low of 4percent in railroad equipment.
Before adopting a more formal approach to analyzing the relationship between
industrial policy, competition, and firm-level outcomes in the next section, we first
report some raw correlations in Table 3. The remainder of the paper will focus only
on domestically owned firms, but for the correlation results we include all enterprises in order to highlight the significant differences across ownership types. All the
reported correlations are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In particular
these correlations indicate: (i) that firms receiving subsidies exhibited higher total
factor productivity levels; (ii) that subsidies were significantly associated with new
product introductions; (iii) that while subsidies and tax holidays are significantly
and positively correlated with firm-level innovation, final goods tariffs are not; and
(iv) that higher levels of TFP are positively correlated with firm-level subsidies and
tax holidays; however, the two other industrial policy measures are negatively correlated with firm-level performance as defined by levels of TFP: final goods tariffs
and low interest payments.
The raw correlations also confirm that SOEs and foreign firms behave quite differently from other enterprises. Industrial policies were also allocated differently for
these enterprises, consistent with the evidence presented in Tables 1 and 2. Public
sector enterprises were more likely to receive subsidies and tariff protection, but
less likely to receive tax holidays. Public ownership was negatively associated with
TFP, with a correlation coefficient of −0.19. These correlations are consistent with
the perception of SOEs as less competitive and less efficient than other enterprises.
Firms with foreign ownership (column 7) were systematically more likely to receive
all types of industrial support. In contrast to SOEs, foreign ownership is positive
and significantly correlated with TFP. The very different performance outcomes
and industrial policy targeting for SOEs and foreign firms justify our decision to
focus on domestically owned enterprises with only minority public ownership in the
remainder of this paper.
Overall, these correlations suggest that some forms of industrial policy, such as
subsidies and tax holidays, were associated with significant firm-level innovation,
while others, such as tariffs, which typically discourage competition, were not. Our
empirical analysis in the next section will confirm these conjectures.
III. Empirical Analysis and Results

In this section, we analyze the complementarity between industrial policy and
competition using two approaches. First, we test the hypothesis that introducing
industrial policies in more competitive sectors is more likely to lead to improved
outcomes. This is a somewhat different approach from “picking winners:” instead,
this approach suggests picking sectors where firms already compete intensively.
The intuition would be that to make government support effective, it needs to be
allocated where there is competition, and not collusion. Second, for given sectoral
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Table 3

Index_
subsidy
Index_subsidy
Index_tax
Index_interest
Final goods tariff
TFP_OP
Public
Foreign
New product share in
sales

1
−0.0047
−0.0248
−0.0373
0.0275
0.0418
0.0116
0.109

Index_
tax

Index_
interest

Final
tariff

TFP_OP

Public

Foreign

1
1
−0.0087
1
−0.0113 −0.016
0.108 −0.0106 −0.118
1
0.0344
0.142 −0.19
1
−0.0679
0.146
0.0821
0.0529
0.152 −0.16
1
0.0489
0.0728 −0.0034
−0.0021 −0.0523 −0.037

New
product
share in
sales

1

Notes: Index_subsidy, index_tax, and index_interest are dummy variables that equal one if a firm receives subsidies,
tax breaks, or a below-median borrowing interest rate, respectively. TFP is estimated with the Olley-Pakes method.
For the OP estimation of TFP, we use a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we use the OP regression method to
obtain estimates for the input coefficients and then calculate TFP (the residual from the production function). In the
second stage, we regress TFP on the remaining controls. Ownership variables public and foreign vary from 0 to 100
percent publicly or foreign owned.

choice, we investigate what would be the best strategy for allocating support across
firms within a sector. In a nutshell, the first approach explores differences across
sectors, whereas the second approach explores how best to allocate industrial policy
support within a sector.
A. Estimation Methods
To implement our first approach, which tests Corollary 1, we measure the correlation of subsidies with competition and then see whether a stronger correlation
coefficient at the city-year level raises firm performance. To measure whether subsidies are biased toward more competitive sectors in city rin year t , we calculate the
correlation between the industry-city level initial degree of competition and current
(period t) subsidies in sector jand city r:
(2)	
Ωr t, subsidy  = Corr(SUBSIDYrjt, COMPETITIONrj0).
Since all industrial policies vary over time, we thus obtain a time-varying change
in the correlation between initial levels of competition in year zero and the patterns
of interventions across different parts of China. We then explore whether higher correlations between current period subsidies and initial competition, as measured by
Ωrt, subsidy , are associated with better performance. As an illustration, if in Shanghai
the largest amount of subsidies are allocated to sectors with low markups, and small
or zero subsidies are given to sectors with high markups in the year 2003, then, for
Shanghai in 2003, this correlation coefficient will be close to unity.
 tax, where
Similarly, we introduce the variables Ωr t, interestand Ωrt,
 , COMPETITIONrj0
 )
(3)	Ωrt, interest  = Corr(INTERESTrjt
 ).
(4)	Ωrt, tax  = Corr(TAXrjt, COMPETITIONrj0
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The only type of industrial policy that does not vary across regions is tariffs, but the
Ωvariable for tariff policies will still vary by location and year because the composition of industrial sectors is different, and the degree of competition varies across
regions. Consequently, we can compute a separate Ω
 variable by replacing subsidies
with tariffs and replacing the correlation between initial competition and subsidies
with the correlation between initial competition and current period tariffs. At the
city level, the correlation between that city’s degree of competition at the beginning
of the sample period and current period tariffs should be strictly exogenous, as the
level of competition is predetermined and tariffs are set at the national, not the city,
level. Our last correlation measure is now defined as
(5)	
Ωrt, tariffs  = Corr(TARIFFjt, COMPETITIONrj0).
Consequently we have four different correlation coefficients that vary only across
locations and over time. These Ω
 variables measure a city’s scope to target more
competitive sectors where competition is predetermined using beginning of period
Lerner indices.10   To calculate our measure of competition, we first aggregate operating profits, capital costs, and sales at the industry level. Under perfect competition,
there should be no excess profits above capital costs, so the Lerner Index should
equal zero and the competition measure should equal o ne. A value of o neindicates
perfect competition, while values below onesuggest some degree of market power.
Our second goal is to identify which approaches to allocating industrial support
within a given sector are most effective. Our main empirical challenge is to capture
the notion of firm-specific industrial support being allocated in a way that preserves
or increases competition. We first consider the sectoral dispersion of industrial support as a measure of the degree of competitiveness. As an (inverse) measure of
sectoral dispersion, we use the Herfindahl index constructed using the share of support each firm in a given sector receives relative to the total support awarded to the
sector. We thus derive a measure of concentration, such as H
 erf _ subsidy , which for
subsidies is given by
  Sum
  
    .
(6)	
Herf _ subsidyijrt  =   ∑ (__________
_ subsidyjrt )
h∈j, h∉i
Subsidyijrt

2

We then do the same thing for tax holidays, and obtain a measure of concentration, H
 erf _ tax  , where
  
  
 
    .
(7)	
Herf _ taxijrt  =   ∑ (_____________
Sum _ TaxHolidayjrt )
h∈j, h∉i
TaxHolidayijrt

2

The amount of tax holiday granted to any firm iis simply the quantity of tax revenues that the firm saves by qualifying for the tax holiday. During the time period
of our analysis, corporate tax rates varied from 15 to 33 percent. Consequently,
the amount of the tax holiday is equal to profits times the tax rate less actual taxes
paid, plus any savings from exemptions to the value-added tax (which was set to 17
10
Recall that the Lerner index is defined as the ratio of operating profits less capital costs to sales. It is an inverse
measure of product market competition.
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p ercent of value-added). If the statutory tax rate facing an enterprise was 20 percent,
then we calculate the tax holidays as the difference between profits multiplied by 20
percent and actual taxes paid. The results are robust to choice of statutory tax rate
(i.e., the top 33 percent rate versus a lower rate).
As with standard Herfindahl indices, a smaller number indicates a higher
degree of dispersion of subsidies or tax holidays, or a more equitable (and
competition-preserving) allocation of those across firms in the sector. We then take
the 1 – these Herfindahl indexes to capture the degree of sectoral dispersion of the
tax holidays or subsidies. The 1 − Herf _ subsidyterm, we call C
 ompHerf _ subsidy.
The 1 − Herf _ taxterm, we call C
 ompHerf _ tax .To the extent that greater dispersion of subsidies within a sector induces greater focus by encouraging more firms to
innovate within a specific sector, we would expect the coefficient on that variable in
the productivity regression to be positive.
We also compute an analogous measure for loans. Since it is difficult to know
what portion of loans are low interest, we identify by sector and year the mean interest rate paid. We compute industrial support as the difference between mean interest
rates paid in a sector and actual interest paid by firms for those enterprises paying
lower rates. To the extent that firms in a particular sector and region are unable
to access capital, we would expect a more concentrated distribution of subsidized
interest payments.
If we were to regress firm-level measures of total factor productivity (TFP) on
these sectoral dispersion measures, such an approach could raise potential endogeneity issues. For example, if governments favor large and more successful firms in
the allocation process, then a firm that accounts for a large share of total tax holidays or subsidies within a sector might also exhibit higher TFP. These would lead
our estimation procedure to reflect spurious relationships between state support and
performance. A similar possibility exists if the government tends to support weaker
enterprises, which could bias the coefficient in the opposite direction.
To address the potential endogeneity of our policy instruments, we calculate them
separately for each firm and exclude the firm’s own industrial support (subsidies, tax
holidays, interest payments) in estimating our Herfindahl measures. This means that
in calculating 1 − Herf _ subsidy , we exclude firm i ’s subsidy in both the numerator
and the denominator. For the inverse of the H
 erf _ taxor the Herf _ int erest , we do the
same exclusion. Consequently, this sector-level measure is exogenous with respect
to firm i’s performance.
Combining our Ω
 s, which measure the links between sectoral targeting and initial competition at the local level, and our Herfindahl indices, which measure the
dispersion of industrial policy, the basic estimating equation can then be written as
follows, where mindicates an industrial policy type:
   + αm Ωmrt
   + ℓi  + dt  + ϵijt, 
(8) ln TFPijrt  = θ1 Zijt  + θ2 Sjt  + βm  CompHerfimjrt
where Z
 is a vector of firm-level controls including state ownership at the firm level.
Although we are excluding 100 percent state-owned enterprises from the analysis,
many so-called private firms retain some degree of state participation. The variable
Sincludes sector-level controls, such as tariffs or the degree of (initial) competition
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in the sector, or the degree of foreign penetration in the sector, as well as upstream
and downstream foreign investment.11
CompHerfimjrt
 is a vector of industrial policies that measures the extent of sectoral dispersion in subsidies, tax holidays, and interest payments. The specification
includes firm fixed effects ℓi as well as time fixed effects dt. Our conjecture is that
αm  > 0,i.e., that industrial policies targeted toward sectors with higher competition as measured by the Lerner Index in the initial year of the sample are more TFP
enhancing. We also conjecture that βmis likely to be positive if the distribution of
industrial policies targets innovators or promotes more competition. We explore different possible targeting schemes in our analysis below.
B. Baseline Results
We begin with the baseline estimates from (8). The critical parameters are the
 m.Table 4 reports the coefficoefficients on the vector of industrial policies α
 mand β
cient estimates. The dependent variable is the log of TFP, using both the Olley-Pakes
(OP) method and OLS with firm-level fixed effects to compute input shares in the
first stage as a comparison. Our OP approach follows Olley and Pakes (1996) in
calculating sector-specific input coefficients in the first stage and is described in
more detail in an online Appendix. As indicated earlier, all specifications include
both time and firm fixed effects. We also include as controls different sector-level
measures of foreign presence, but do not report them in Table 4.
More Dispersed Intervention Is More TFP-Enhancing.—To the extent that
greater dispersion of subsidies within a sector induces greater focus by encouraging
more firms to innovate within a specific sector, we would expect the coefficient on
CompHerfto be positive. This is precisely what we obtain in the first row of Table 4,
which shows positive and significant coefficients on C
 ompHerffor subsidies. The
coefficient estimates in column 1 indicate that a perfectly dispersed set of subsidies,
leading to a Herfindahl for subsidies of 0 and consequently the complement of that
at 1, would increase TFP by 3.9 percentage points.
The coefficient on Ωr t, subsidiesindicates the extent to which targeting at the city
level via subsidies is more efficient in more competitive industries, as measured by
the initial degree of competition at the beginning of the sample period. The coefficient estimates are reported in the second row of Table 4. While the coefficient is
positive across all specifications, it is not significantly different from zero.
Together, the first two rows of Table 4 indicate that while allocating subsidies to
initially more competitive sectors did not significantly affect productivity, a greater
dispersion of subsidies was associated with improved firm performance. Later
we will explore how moving beyond equitable allocations of subsidies to targeting innovative firms could further increase the positive impact of firm subsidies on
performance.

11
For more discussion of the measures of foreign presence, which include measures for horizontal (“horizontal”) and vertical (“backward” and “forward”) foreign exposure, see Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2012).
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Table 4—Competitiveness of Industrial Policies and Firm Productivity
TFP_OLSFE
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

CompHerf_subsidy 0.0388***
(0.00976)
Cor_subsidy_lerner 0.00225
(0.00348)
CompHerf_tax

0.0305***
(0.00824)

CompHerf_interest
Cor_interest_lerner
Cor_tariff_lerner
Lerner
Lernersquare

Index_subsidy
Index_tax
Index_interest
lnTariff
Constant
Observations
R 2

0.0859***
(0.0230)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.0407***
(0.0110)
0.00115
(0.00338)

−0.0151***
(0.00421)

(8)
0.0319***
(0.00918)
0.00009
(0.00394)

0.103***
(0.0229)

−0.0152***
(0.00417)

0.0766*** 0.0568***
(0.0169)
(0.0164)

0.0133*** 0.0124***
(0.00399) (0.00450)

0.0861***
(0.0249)

−0.0161***
(0.00458)

0.0845*** 0.0669***
(0.0195)
(0.0190)

0.0126*** 0.0122***
(0.00389) (0.00445)

−0.0411*** −0.0208** −0.0330*** −0.0305**
(0.0143)
(0.00975) (0.00995) (0.0147)

−0.0312** −0.0163
(0.0145)
(0.0101)

−0.0281*** −0.0199
(0.0104)
(0.0149)

−6.141**
(2.591)

−5.362*** −5.413*** −5.953**
(1.898)
(1.886)
(2.493)

−6.963**
(3.458)

−4.927**
(2.060)

−5.108**
(2.066)

0.00293
(0.00470)

5.35e-05
(0.00428)

−0.000432
(0.00399)

0.00310
(0.00481)

−0.000412 −0.000588
(0.00425) (0.00397)

10.63**
(4.712)

Exportshare_sector 0.328**
(0.141)
Stateshare

0.000959
(0.00397)

0.0999***
(0.0207)

−0.0143***
(0.00396)

Cor_tax_lerner

TFP_OP
(4)

9.349***
(3.449)

9.404***
(3.417)

10.26**
(4.535)

0.370***
(0.139)

0.346**
(0.139)

0.343**
(0.141)

0.00301
(0.00504)

0.0116*** 0.0110*** 0.0116*** 0.0105***
(0.00181) (0.00170) (0.00168) (0.00190)

0.0220*** 0.0201*** 0.0218*** 0.0205***
(0.00104) (0.000951) (0.000906) (0.00108)

12.98**
(6.320)

0.632***
(0.178)

9.099**
(3.677)

0.683***
(0.175)

9.396**
(3.677)

0.651***
(0.175)

12.05*
(6.102)

−6.464*
(3.344)

0.660***
(0.178)
0.00315
(0.00514)

0.00805*** 0.00759*** 0.00833*** 0.00674***
(0.00193) (0.00187) (0.00185) (0.00199)
0.0214*** 0.0197*** 0.0213*** 0.0200***
(0.00103) (0.000897) (0.000873) (0.00103)

−0.0129*** −0.0142*** −0.0157*** −0.0120***
(0.00163) (0.00144) (0.00148) (0.00169)

−0.0109*** −0.0124*** −0.0139*** −0.0101***
(0.00187) (0.00164) (0.00167) (0.00192)

−2.876
(2.196)

−4.500
(2.945)

0.0716
(0.0579)

810,740
0.205

0.0619
(0.0556)

−2.378
(1.627)

903,455
0.205

0.0626
(0.0556)

−2.398
(1.607)

962,076
0.205

0.0690
(0.0576)

−2.776
(2.133)

746,304
0.208

0.0527
(0.0570)

810,740
0.181

0.0416
(0.0551)

−2.655
(1.696)

903,455
0.183

0.0449
(0.0549)

−2.794
(1.690)

962,076
0.182

0.0476
(0.0565)

−4.154
(2.858)

746,304
0.184

Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable is TFP (estimated by OLS with fixed
effects in columns 1, 2, 3, 4; estimated by Olley-Pakes method in columns 5, 6, 7, 8). For the OP estimation of TFP, it’s indeed a
two-stage estimation. In the first stage, we use the OP regression method to obtain estimates for the input coefficients and then calculate TFP (the residual from the production function). In the second stage, we regress TFP on the remaining controls. Each regression includes firm fixed effects and year dummies. CompHerf_subsidy, CompHerf_tax, and CompHerf_interest are Herfindhal
indices of subsidy, tax, and interest rate policies, measured on the city-industry-year level. Corr_subsidy_lerner, corr_tax_lerner,
and corr_tarriff_lerner are constructed by the correlation between the industry-city level initial degree of competition (represented
by lerner index) and the current period of subsidies, taxes, and interest rates; all the correlations are on the city-year level. Each
regression includes industry fixed effect and year dummies. Export share is calculated by export procurement divided by industrial
sales. State share is defined as the proportion of the firm’s state assets to its total equity. Those two shares are aggregated at the sector-year level. Index_subsidy, index_tax, and index_interest are dummy variables that are equal to one if a firm receives subsidies,
tax breaks, or a below-median borrowing interest rate, respectively. Sector-level FDI and other (input) tariffs are also included as
controls but not reported.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

The next row of Table 4 looks at the correlation between firm-level TFP and our
measure for the dispersion of tax holidays CompHerf _ tax. The coefficient is statistically significant and positive, indicating that greater dispersion of tax holidays
increases productivity. The coefficient estimate, which varies from 0.086 to 0.103,
indicates driving the Herfindahl for the dispersion of tax holidays on income taxes
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and value-added taxes to 0 would lead to an increase in TFP of 8.6 to 10.3 percentage points.
The coefficient estimate on the correlation between taxes and initial competition
Ωrt, taxat the city level in column 1, equal to −0.0143 , indicates that if the correlation
between tax holidays and competition at the city level was perfect (100 percent),
then productivity would be 1.43 percent higher. Based on the sample means, a 1
standard deviation increase in the city-industry correlation would increase TFP by
0.3 percentage points for firms in that city and industry.
The fifth row of Table 4 reports the impact of wider dispersion of interest payments for loans on productivity outcomes. The coefficient on the Herfindahl for
interest payments is positive and significant across all specifications, indicating that
a wider dispersion of subsidized interest payments is consistent with higher productivity at the firm level. The coefficient estimate varies from 0.057 to 0.085, indicating that a perfectly disperse set of interest payments would be associated with higher
productivity by 5.7 to 8.5 percentage points. A 1 standard deviation increase in the
variable would be associated with a 1.2 to 1.6 percentage point increase in TFP.12
While the first three columns of Table 4 report the effects of different industrial policies separately, column 4 combines all of them in one specification. The
coefficient estimates are unaffected. The results in column 4 indicate that a more
equitable dispersion of subsidies, tax holidays, and interest payments across firms
within a sector are unequivocally associated with higher productivity growth at the
firm level. While a higher level of subsidies or tax holidays are associated with
higher productivity in initially competitive sectors, the results are mixed or negative
for loans and tariffs. We shall see below that the positive effects at the city level of
subsidies and tax holidays, and the mixed role of tariffs and low interest loans, are
consistent with their individual effects at the firm level.
Robustness.—The coefficient estimates when using OP to estimate TFP are
reported in the last four columns of Table 4. Consistent with reviews of the productivity literature, the results are not very different when using OP estimates of TFP
versus OLS with firm fixed effects. One difference is that the coefficient on the correlation of tariffs and initial competition becomes insignificant, but remains negative
with an attenuated coefficient.
The remaining part of Table 4 reports the coefficients on the sector- and firm-level
controls. At the sector level, competition measured using 1 − Lerneris positively
and significantly associated with increased TFP. We also include a squared term,
and the coefficient is negative. This nonlinear relationship between competition and
productivity, which is increasing at lower levels and falling at higher levels, is consistent with the inverted U-shape found in particular by Aghion et al. (2005). If,
12
While the first five rows of Table 4 suggest potentially significant positive effects of industrial policies, these
are not uniform. In particular, the correlation between interest payments and competition is positive, suggesting
improved TFP when effective interest rates are higher in more initially competitive sectors. Similarly, the correlation between tariffs and competition in the sector is negative, indicating that tariff interventions in more competitive
sectors have been associated with lower TFP. The coefficient estimate, which ranges from −0.0199 to −0.0411,
suggests that if higher tariffs were perfectly correlated with higher initial competition, then TFP would be from 2
to 4 percentage points lower.
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instead, we measure competition using sectoral export shares, we also find a significant and positive association with TFP. This strong, positive, independent impact of
competition, measured using either the sector-level Lerner Index or export shares,
is consistent with an important role for competition in enhancing firm performance.
One question that might arise is the potential endogeneity of the Lerner Index and
its square, which are included as controls. We address the potential endogeneity of
the correlation and Herfindahl measures by explicitly excluding the own firm in the
calculations, and using initial period Lerners to construct the correlations. For the
Lerner control measures, endogeneity is also unlikely to be a problem as we use the
initial period Lerner measure in that location and sector. Using Lerner measures as
controls that were calculated at the beginning of the sample period mitigates possible reverse causality between firm behavior, sectoral productivity distributions, and
market structure.
We also include controls for subsidies, tax holidays, tariffs, and low interest
loans at the individual enterprise level. We include a zero-one control variable,
index _ subsidy , which is equal to one if the enterprise received nonzero and positive
subsidy amounts in that year. We also include a zero-one control indicating whether
the firm received tax holidays, index _ tax. The tax break is defined as a zero-one variable indicating whether the firm paid either taxes at a lower rate than the statutory
corporate tax rate or value-added taxes at a lower rate than the statutory rate. The
coefficients on the subsidy and tax holiday dummies are positive and significant. We
also include a control for loans, which is equal to one if the firm’s interest payments
to current liabilities (an effective interest rate) are below the average for that sector and year. The coefficient on the index_interest term is negative and significant.
Firms that receive lower interest rates do not perform better when performance is
measured using TFP. These results for loans as an industrial policy measure are
consistent with the coefficients on the industry-city correlations, indicating better
performance at the city level when interest payments are higher.13
Summarizing.—Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that preserving competition
through a more equitable targeting policy is associated with superior performance,
as measured by productivity. We addressed the potential endogeneity of targeting by
excluding a firm’s own subsidies or tax holidays when estimating the impact of sectoral dispersion of subsidies or tax holidays on that firm’s TFP. Overall, the evidence
suggests that instruments such as tax holidays and subsidies have systemically been
associated with improved productivity performance when combined with high initial levels of competition, as measured by the Lerner Index.
One interesting question to ask is how much actual tariff and subsidy levels at
the city-industry level were in fact correlated with actual competition levels. The
summary statistics in Table A1 in the Appendix suggest that in fact the Chinese
13
The impact of tariffs depends on where they are allocated. While final tariffs facing a sector are positively
associated with TFP, the effect is not statistically significant. Higher tariffs in input or using sectors have negative
effects on firm TFP. These insignificant or negative effects of tariff protection on firm-level TFP are consistent with
our results showing that even if tariffs are targeted at more competitive sectors they fail to yield improved performance. Tariffs discourage competition and are generally second-best incentive devices, so it is not surprising that
using tariffs as a tool of industrial policy is not effective in the Chinese context.
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government did not set tariff or subsidy levels higher in cities or industries where
competition was more intense. The average correlation coefficient between tariffs
and the Lerner measure is −0.02, suggesting almost 0 correlation between tariffs
and competition. The correlation with subsidies is positive but close to 0, at 0.03.
The only instrument where there is significant targeting is taxes, where the correlation with competition is equal to −0.1. The coefficient of −0.1 is suggestive of a
strong negative association between more initial competition and lower taxes. While
the evidence in Table 4 is consistent with higher performance as measured by TFP
when policy instruments are introduced in conjunction with greater competition,
the actual pattern of policies does not suggest that this is what the Chinese actually
did. One interpretation is that there is enormous scope for improved performance
outcomes associated with industrial policy if it is introduced in a way that preserves
competition in the future.
C. Targeting Innovative Enterprises
Should some firms receive more support than others? This is the question we
address in Table 5. If industrial policies are more effective when they induce greater
competition between innovating firms, as we are hypothesizing, then it should in
principle be possible to improve on a purely equitable distribution by targeting firms
most likely to engage in innovation. The new heterogeneous firm literature pioneered
by Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003) predicts that the most productive firms are
also likely to be the largest firms. These firms are also likely, in the heterogeneous
firm literature, to be the lowest cost and most competitive producers. Consequently,
one possibility is to redo the analysis with Herfindahls but give greater weight to
larger enterprises. We report the unweighted results in columns 1 and 2, and the
results weighting by firm size using number of employees in column 3.
Another way to induce greater competition is to promote new entry and encourage
younger firms to enter. To capture the importance of entry, we redo the Herfindahls
and weight the individual subsidy, interest, and tax holiday allocations by the inverse
of a firm’s age. Effectively, this means giving the greatest weight to the youngest
firms. These results are reported in column 4 of Table 5.
The results in Table 5 suggest that in the Chinese case, targeting younger but not
bigger firms significantly increases the positive impact of industrial policies on total
factor productivity.14 For subsidies, the coefficient on the Herfindahl increases by
a factor of 3. The coefficient estimate, at 0.10, indicates that a 1 standard deviation
increase in the Herfindahl would increase a firm’s TFP by 3 percentage points. One
reason why targeting younger firms may be more beneficial is that younger firms
generally have higher TFP (measured either using the OP procedure or OLS with
firm fixed effects).
One potential pitfall of measuring process innovation using total factor productivity is when output is calculated using sector deflators with firm-level revenue.
This revenue-based TFP is potentially misleading because it could reflect changes

14

This is consistent with the analysis in Acemoglu et al. (2013).
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Table 5—The Impact of the Competitiveness of Industrial Policies on Firm TFP:
Weighted Herfindhal
Variables
CompHerf_subsidy
CompHerf_tax
CompHerf_interest
Comp_Herfsubsidy_weightsize

TFP_OLSFE
(1)
0.0305***
(0.00824)
0.0859***
(0.0230)
0.0568***
(0.0164)

TFP_OP
(2)
0.0319***
(0.00918)
0.0861***
(0.0249)
0.0669***
(0.0190)

Comp_Herftax_weightsize
Comp_Herfinterest_weightsize
Comp_Herfsubsidy_weightage

TFP_OP
(3)

0.0255***
(0.00909)
0.0555***
(0.0124)
0.0616***
(0.00983)

Comp_Herftax_weightage
Comp_Herfinterest_weightage
Lerner
Lernersquare
Index_subsidy
Index_tax
Index_interest
Exportshare_sector
Stateshare
Constant
Observations
R 2

10.26**
(4.535)
−5.953**
(2.493)
0.0105***
(0.00190)
0.0205***
(0.00108)
−0.0120***
(0.00169)
0.343**
(0.141)
0.00301
(0.00504)
−2.776
(2.133)
746,304
0.208

12.05*
(6.102)
−6.464*
(3.344)
0.00674***
(0.00199)
0.0200***
(0.00103)
−0.0101***
(0.00192)
0.660***
(0.178)
0.00315
(0.00514)
−4.154
(2.858)
746,304
0.184

12.72**
(6.253)
−6.813*
(3.420)
0.00781***
(0.00198)
0.0201***
(0.00104)
−0.0100***
(0.00191)
0.672***
(0.179)
0.00273
(0.00516)
−4.474
(2.936)
747,158
0.182

TFP_OP
(4)

0.102***
(0.0313)
0.0781***
(0.0255)
0.0541**
(0.0253)
12.62**
(6.262)
−6.760*
(3.424)
0.00786***
(0.00196)
0.0200***
(0.00105)
−0.0100***
(0.00192)
0.673***
(0.179)
0.00289
(0.00511)
−4.521
(2.944)
746,740
0.182

Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. For column 1, the dependent variable is
TFP (estimated by OLS with fixed effects); in columns 2, 3, and 4, TFP is estimated by OP as described in the
text. Each regression includes firm fixed effects and year dummies. CompHerf_subsidy, CompHerf_tax, and
CompHerf_interest are Herfindhal indices of subsidy, tax, and interest rate policies, measured on the city-industry-year level. Columns 1 and 2 use an unweighted Herfindhal index, column 3 computes a Herfindhal index
weighted by firm size (number of employees), and column 4 weights the Herfindhal index using 1/age (year since
establishment). Export share is calculated by export procurement divided by industrial sales. State share is defined
as the proportion of the firm’s state assets to its total equity. Those two shares are aggregated at the sector-year level.
Index_subsidy, index_tax, and index_interest are dummy variables which equal to one if a firm receives subsidies,
tax breaks, or a b elow-median borrowing interest rate, respectively. Sector FDI and tariff measures are included
but not reported.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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in firm-specific quality or markups. One solution exists when firm-specific price
deflators are available, which account for price heterogeneity (due to market power
differences or quality differences) across firms. For the Chinese industrial census
data, such firm-specific deflators are available for the years 1998 through 2003.
Consequently, we redo the results presented in Table 5 with this shorter time series,
using the firm-specific price deflators to calculate first output and then TFP. The
results using firm-specific price deflators to calculate TFP are reported in Table 6.
The sample size using the earlier years is considerably smaller, at only a quarter
of the full sample. However, the results are quite robust. The coefficient on the subsidy Herfindahl, calculated using the OP procedure, increases from 0.03 in Table 5
to 0.06, a doubling of magnitudes. The coefficients for the dispersion of tax holidays
and low interest loans also increase significantly. The evidence suggests that using
a much smaller sample and implementing firm-specific prices magnifies the effects
significantly.
Another potential concern is the possible mismeasurement of TFP using OP
when policies are omitted in the first stage. Recent developments in the productivity
literature suggest that excluding policies in the first stage could lead to biased estimates in the first stage of OP, which estimates input share coefficients. To test for
this possibility, we redid the analysis adding all the key policies in the first stage,
and report the results in the last two columns of Table 6. The coefficients on the
herfindahl terms remain significant and even more important in magnitude than the
original specification reported in Table 4. The evidence in Table 6 suggests that our
results emphasizing the positive impact of dispersion on productivity are robust to
many different specifications and subsamples.
D. Within-Firm versus Across-Firm Reallocation Effects of Industrial Policy
In recent years, applied productivity researchers have shifted their focus away
from the determinants of changes in behavior within the same firm to address market share reallocation across firms and the consequences for aggregate productivity.
This shift in focus can be traced to the work of Olley and Pakes (1996), who propose a simple approach to disentangling within versus between components. The
interest in within versus between firm reallocation also increased with the work
of Hopenhayn (1992), Melitz (2003), and others, who assume that firms have a
predetermined exogenous productivity draw, and that consequently much of industry productivity growth is not through learning within a firm but through reallocation of market shares across firms.15
Tables 4 through 6 explored the extent to which within-firm productivity gains
were affected by how different types of industrial policies were allocated across
firms. In Table 7, we explore reallocation toward more productive enterprises. This
15
The empirical work in this area has somewhat lagged behind the theoretical contributions. One of the first
to apply the Olley and Pakes (1996) decomposition was Pavcnik (2003), who found that reallocation accounted
for up to two-thirds of productivity growth at the industry level and within-firm learning accounted for one-third.
For India, the results are the opposite: Harrison, Martin, and Nataraj (2013) find that most of industry productivity
growth is due to within-firm effects and almost none is due to market share reallocations. This result for India is
corroborated by work by Sivadasan (2010).

Vol. 7 No. 4

aghion et al.: Industrial policy and competition

21

Table 6—Competitiveness of Industrial Policies and Firm Productivity:
Robustness Check with TFP Calculated by Firm-Level Price Deflator and TFP
Modified to Include Policies in First-Stage OP Estimation
Using firm-level prices
Variables
CompHerf_subsidy
CompHerf_tax
CompHerf_interest
Lerner
Lernersquare
Exportshare_sector
Stateshare
Index_subsidy
Index_tax
Index_interest
Observations
R 2

TFP_OLSFE
(1)
0.0325**
(0.0150)
0.0497
(0.0387)
0.0341
(0.0299)
17.42***
(5.885)
−9.200***
(3.283)
0.506
(0.423)
0.0119
(0.00929)
0.0110***
(0.00325)
0.0143***
(0.00206)
−0.0109***
(0.00248)
182,248
0.082

TFP_OP
(2)
0.0560**
(0.0228)
0.126**
(0.0568)
0.0920**
(0.0437)
21.61**
(8.681)
−11.22**
(4.793)
0.354
(0.610)
0.0147
(0.0108)
0.0101**
(0.00383)
0.0143***
(0.00218)
−0.0162***
(0.00322)
182,248
0.129

Adding policies in first-stage OP
TFP_OLSFE
(3)
0.0306***
(0.00857)
0.0857***
(0.0234)
0.0573***
(0.0172)
10.19**
(4.554)
−5.902**
(2.499)
0.350**
(0.146)
0.00319
(0.00503)
0.0104***
(0.00191)
0.0204***
(0.00108)
−0.0120***
(0.00173)
746,304
0.207

TFP_OP
(4)
0.0427***
(0.0109)
0.111***
(0.0285)
0.0876***
(0.0230)
10.09**
(4.179)
−5.474**
(2.317)
0.606***
(0.205)
0.00107
(0.00411)
0.0107***
(0.00184)
0.0219***
(0.000902)
−0.0161***
(0.00185)
962,076
0.191

Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. Regressions in the first
two columns are based on a subsample of firms existed for all years between 1998 and 2003.
We use this subsample in order to calculate the TFP using firm-level price-deflator, which is
calculated by current value of output divided by constant value of output. The dependent variable is TFP (estimated by OLS with fixed effects in columns 1 and 3; estimated by Olley-Pakes
method in columns 2 and 4). Each regression includes firm fixed effects and year dummies.
CompHerf_subsidy, CompHerf_tax, and CompHerf_interest are Herfindhal indices of subsidy,
tax, and interest rate policies, measured on the city-industry-year level. Export share is calculated by export procurement divided by industrial sales. State share is defined as the proportion
of the firm’s state assets to its total equity. Those two shares are aggregated at the sector-year
level. Index_subsidy, index_tax, and index_interest are dummy variables that equal to one if
a firm receives subsidies, tax breaks, or a below-median borrowing interest rate, respectively.
Other controls include horizontal and vertical FDI shares and input and output tariffs, but the
coefficients are not reported in this table. Columns 3 and 4 include policy variables above in the
first stage of the OP estimation, which estimates factor share coefficients.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

in turn requires a measure of TFP at the sector level. We recalculate our measure of
TFP at the city-sector-year level, and execute the same specification as in Table 4
using these more aggregate reallocation terms. The results are reported in Table 7.
Now, instead of focusing on whether industrial policies encourage the same firm
over time to innovate more, we focus on whether industrial policies encourage reallocation of market shares toward the more productive enterprises. One can think of
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Table 7—Competitiveness of Industrial Policies and Reallocation
Variables
CompHerf_subsidy
CompHerf_tax
CompHerf_interest
Comp_Herfsubsidy_
weightsize

TFP_OLSFE
(1)

TFP_OP
(2)

−0.0116*** −0.0108***
(0.00207)
(0.00194)
0.0283***
0.0173***
(0.00576)
(0.00494)
0.0528***
0.0496***
(0.00431)
(0.00426)

CompHerf_tax_weightsize
CompHerf_interest_
weightsize
CompHerf_subsidy_
weightage
CompHerf_tax_weightage
CompHerf_interest_
weightage
Lerner
Lernersquare
Exportshare_sector
Stateshare
Index_subsidy
Index_tax
Index_interest
Constant
Observations
R   2

TFP_OLSFE
(3)

−0.00199
(0.00598)
0.0175**
(0.00806)
0.0667***
(0.00712)

TFP_OP
(4)

TFP_OLSFE
(5)

TFP_OP
(6)

0.00223
(0.00571)
0.00853
(0.00764)
0.0617***
(0.00659)

0.0668***
0.0536***
(0.00776)
(0.00728)
0.0892***
0.0743***
(0.00590)
(0.00648)
0.100***
0.0880***
(0.00573)
(0.00665)
1.202***
1.082***
1.226***
1.095***
1.121***
1.008***
(0.305)
(0.273)
(0.319)
(0.282)
(0.310)
(0.275)
−0.807*** −0.720*** −0.819*** −0.725*** −0.759*** −0.676***
(0.187)
(0.167)
(0.195)
(0.171)
(0.189)
(0.167)
0.0156
0.00170
0.0127
0.00173
0.0195
0.00620
(0.113)
(0.106)
(0.115)
(0.106)
(0.112)
(0.104)
0.0168
0.0317
0.0157
−0.0775
−0.0596
−0.0792
(0.0962)
(0.0956)
(0.0991)
(0.0977)
(0.0993)
(0.0980)
0.000158 −0.00416
0.00754*
0.00432
0.0286***
0.0202***
(0.00387)
(0.00353)
(0.00410)
(0.00378)
(0.00507)
(0.00469)
−0.00263
−0.00148
−0.00264
−0.00201
−0.00355
−0.00279
(0.00234)
(0.00203)
(0.00242)
(0.00215)
(0.00234)
(0.00207)
0.00671**
0.00637**
0.0125***
0.0118***
0.0157***
0.0145***
(0.00288)
(0.00279)
(0.00296)
(0.00284)
(0.00297)
(0.00288)
−2.539*** −2.417*** −2.622*** −2.494*** −2.696*** −2.553***
(0.199)
(0.231)
(0.198)
(0.230)
(0.200)
(0.234)
64,455
0.080

64,455
0.068

64,455
0.069

64,455
0.060

64,455
0.093

64,455
0.079

Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable is a measure of
between-firm reallocation of TFP (estimated by OLS with fixed effects in columns 1, 3, and 5; estimated by
Olley-Pakes method in columns 2, 4, and 6). CompHerf_subsidy, CompHerf_tax, and CompHerf_interest are
Herfindhal indices of subsidy, tax, and interest rate policies, measured on the city-industry-year level. Columns 1–2
use unweighted Herfindhal indices, columns 3–4 are based on Herfindhal indices weighted by firm size (number of employees), and columns 5–6 calculate Herfindahl indices weighted by 1/age (year since establishment).
Each regression includes industry fixed effects and year dummies. Export share is calculated by export procurement
divided by industrial sales. State share is defined as the proportion of the firm’s state assets to its total equity. Those
two shares are aggregated at the sector-year level. Index_subsidy, Index_tax, and Index_interest are defined as the
share of firms within each city-industry-year receiving subsidies, tax breaks, or below-median interest rates, respectively. All specifications include sector-level FDI controls.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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this as exploring the extensive margin of productivity growth rather than the intensive margin, which focuses on improvements in firm performance within the same
firm over time.
The first two columns of Table 7 report the relationship between the reallocation
component of industry-city-level production and our policy measures. Column 1
reports the measures when TFP is calculated using OLS with firm fixed effects, and
column 2 reports the OP estimates. The results indicate that while a broader distribution of low interest loans and tax holidays are significantly and positively associated
with greater productivity improvements due to reallocation toward more productive
firms, the unweighted results for subsidies are negative. Taken together with our
earlier results, we can conclude that while low interest policies were not effective
in contributing to within-firm improvements in innovation, they did encourage reallocation of market share toward more innovative firms. Low interest policies and a
broader dispersion of tax holidays contributed to the extensive margin of productivity growth. The same is not true for subsidies, which appear to have operated more
at the intensive margin, inducing within firm productivity improvements.
The next four columns of Table 7 report the outcomes when we weight industrial
policy by firm size or the inverse of age. The results indicate that the impact of
subsidies switch from negative to positive, suggesting that they can play a positive
role in encouraging the reallocation component of TFP growth if they are directed
at younger or larger enterprises.16 As with the earlier results, the largest impact on
TFP occurs when industrial policies are oriented toward younger enterprises. The
last two columns of Table 7 show significant TFP gains from reallocation of market
share when subsidies, tax holidays, and low interest loans are focused on younger
enterprises.
IV. Conclusion

In this paper, we have argued that sectoral state aid can foster productivity growth
to a larger extent when it targets more competitive sectors and especially when it is
not concentrated on one or a small number of firms within the sector.
Thus, using a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises in China
between 1998 and 2007, we show that industrial policies (subsidies or tax holidays)
that are allocated to competitive sectors (as measured by the Lerner Index) or allocated in such a way as to preserve or increase competition (e.g., by inducing entry
or encouraging younger enterprises), have a more positive and significant impact on
productivity or productivity growth.
If we focus on the intensive margin of within-firm behavior, spreading these
instruments across more firms is associated with positive productivity increases at
16
One question which arises is to what extent TFP growth in China reflects primarily increases in average firm
productivity versus reallocation of market shares. In the Chinese case, only 5 percent of industry level TFP reflects
the reallocation component, as reported in Appendix Table A2 The small role of market share reallocation underscores the importance of focusing on individual firm-level productivity changes, which has been the focus of most
of our analysis. While market share reallocation has increased during the sample period, it is significantly smaller
than in countries like the United States. The predominance of firm level productivity as accounting for industry level
performance for China was also highlighted by Loren Brandt and his coauthors.
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the firm level. Even greater benefits, leading to a doubling or tripling of the effects,
is associated with allocating more benefits to more competitive (i.e., typically
younger) firms.
We also find evidence of improved firm performance when industrial policies are
targeted toward sectors with initially more competition. This is true for subsidies
and tax breaks as instruments of industrial policy, but not for loans or tariffs. 17
This in turn suggests that the issue should be on how to design and govern sectoral policies in order to make them more competition-friendly and therefore more
growth-enhancing. Our analysis suggests that proper selection criteria together with
good guidelines for governing sectoral support can make a significant difference in
terms of growth and innovation performance.
Yet the issue remains: how to minimize the scope for influence activities by sectoral interests when a sectoral state aid policy is to be implemented? One answer is
that the less concentrated and more competition-friendly the allocation of state aid
to a sector, the less firms in that sector will lobby for that aid as they will anticipate
lower profits from it. In other words, political economy considerations should reinforce the interaction between competition and the efficiency of sectoral state aid. A
comprehensive analysis of the optimal governance of sectoral policies still awaits
further research.
One question that might arise is how this approach can work when there are significant economies of scale. We tested the framework in the context of the Chinese
domestic market, which is large enough to allow producers to exploit scale economies in most industrial sectors. In a smaller economy, the question of how to
encourage more focus and rivalry while allowing firms to reap the cost gains from
exploiting scale economies would have more relevance. In that context, competition
could be preserved by exposing firms to international rivalry. It is not surprising that
smaller economies like South Korea were able to exploit the benefits of competition by forcing firms that received targeted support to compete on global markets.
Further research exploring the implementation of industrial policy under increasing
returns remains an avenue for future research.

17

In China, low interest loans and tariffs were associated on net with lower productivity performance of targeted
manufacturing firms. Not surprisingly, thus allocating higher tariffs or more low interest loans towards more competitive sectors as a result was not associated with improved productivity performance. A main implication from
our analysis is that the debate on industrial policy should no longer be for or against the wisdom of such a policy.
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Appendix A
Table A1—Means and Standard Deviations for Variables
Variable
CompHerf_subsidy
CompHerf_tax
CompHerf_interest
Corr_subsidy_lerner
Corr_tax_lerner
Corr_interest_lerner
Corr_tariff_lerner
Lerner
Lerner_squared
Index_subsidy
Index_tax
Index_interest
Export_share
Stateshare
Horizontal_FDI
Backward_FDI
Forward_FDI
lnTariff
ln_Indirect_tariff
ln_Input_tariff
log of TFP (OLS with firm fixed effects)
log of TFP (Olley Pakes)

Mean

Standard
deviation

0.570
0.871
0.846
0.0292
−0.100
0.0477
−0.0164
0.988
0.976
0.114
0.423
0.690
0.175
0.0215
0.240
0.0741
0.0987
2.389
1.971
2.074
2.016
1.853

0.337
0.196
0.204
0.172
0.216
0.198
0.165
0.0257
0.0476
0.318
0.494
0.462
0.152
0.127
0.128
0.0401
0.148
0.472
0.413
0.638
0.448
0.464

Min.

Max.

0
0
0
−1
−1
−1
−1
0.0275
0.000756
0
0
0
0.00634
0
0.000722
0.00984
0
0.861
0.902
−1.376
−0.229
−0.512

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.685
1
0.939
0.498
1.264
4.174
3.230
3.099
11.49
11.17

Table A2—Percentage of TFP Increase Due to Reallocation of Market Share
versus Average Firm Productivity Increases
Variable
1999
Reallocation share (OLS with fixed effects)
Average firm productivity (OLS with fixed effects)
Reallocation share (OP)
Average firm productivity (OP)
2000
Reallocation share (OLS with fixed effects)
Average firm productivity (OLS with fixed effects)
Reallocation share (OP)
Average firm productivity (OP)
2001
Reallocation share (OLS with fixed effects)
Average firm productivity (OLS with fixed effects)
Reallocation share (OP)
Average firm productivity (OP)
2004
Reallocation share (OLS with fixed effects)
Average firm productivity (OLS with fixed effects)
Reallocation share (OP)
Average firm productivity (OP)
2007
Reallocation share (OLS with fixed effects)
Average firm productivity (OLS with fixed effects)
Reallocation share (OP)
Average firm productivity (OP)

Observations

Mean

Standard deviation

7,714
7,714
7,714
7,714

0.0359349
0.9640651
0.0351037
0.9648963

0.0509876
0.0509876
0.0535686
0.0535686

7,649
7,649
7,649
7,649

0.0389031
0.9610969
0.0377865
0.9622135

0.0538936
0.0538936
0.0579714
0.0579714

7,872
7,872
7,872
7,872

0.0403249
0.9596751
0.0389779
0.9610221

0.0520197
0.0520197
0.0533513
0.0533513

8,382
8,382
8,382
8,382

0.0485715
0.9514285
0.0456245
0.9543755

0.0558423
0.0558423
0.0563391
0.0563391

8,697
8,697
8,697
8,697

0.0552214
0.9447786
0.0523665
0.9476335

0.0572704
0.0572704
0.0581827
0.0581827
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Appendix B
A. Basic Setup
Preferences and Production.—We consider a two-period model of an economy
producing two goods, denoted by Aand B
 . Denote the quantity consumed on each
good by x   Aand x  B. The representative consumer has income equal to 2 E and utility
log (x  A)  +  log ( x  B) when consuming x  Aand x  B. This means that, if the price of good
iis p  i , demand for good iwill be x  i  = E/p  i  .To simplify the writing, we assume
that E = 1throughout this paper.18
The production can be done by one of two “big” firms 1 , 2,or by “fringe firms.”
Fringe firms act competitively and have a constant marginal cost of production of
cfwhereas firms j = 1, 2have an initial marginal cost of c  , where 1 > cf  ≥ c .
The assumption c f  ≥ creflects the cost advantage of firms 1 , 2with respect to the
fringe and the assumption 1 > cinsures that equilibrium quantities can be greater
than 1. Marginal costs are firm-specific and are independent of the sector in which
production is undertaken.
Innovation.—For simplicity, we assume that only firms 
1, 2can innovate.
Innovation reduces production costs, but the size of the cost reduction is different
between the two sectors Aand B. Without loss of generality, we assume that in sector A,innovations reduce production costs from cto c/γA   = c/(γ + δ), whereas
in sector B
 they reduce costs from c to c /γB   = c/(γ − δ),where γ − δ > 1 or
δ < γ − 1.
We also make the simple assumption that, with equal probability, each firm can
be chosen to be the potential innovator. To innovate with probability q this firm must
incur effort cost q   2/2. This is like saying that each firm has an exogenous probability of getting a patentable idea, which then has to be turned into cost reduction
thanks to effort exerted by the firm.
Competition.—We assume Bertrand competition within each sector unless the
two leading firms choose the same sector and collude within that sector. Let φ be
the probability of the two leading firms colluding in the same sector when they have
the same cost, and let us assume that when colluding the two firms behave as a joint
monopoly taking the fringe cost c fas given. In this case, the expected profit of each
cf  − c
leading firm with cost c < 
cfis φ _  12   ____
cf since when collusion fails firms compete
Bertrand.
Industrial Policy via Tax/Subsidies.—Laissez-faire can lead to diversification
(different sector choices by the two firms) or focus (same choice, be it A
 or B). For
industrial policy we will focus on interventions based on taxes or subsidies that are
proportional to profit levels, that is on tax levels t A, tB per profit level in sectors A, B,
18
As will be soon apparent, the rate of innovation is linear in E , and except for this size effect, what matters for
the analysis are the ratios E/cand E/cf .
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respectively, where tk  < 0is a subvention and tk  > 0is a tax.19 We restrict attention to the case where there is perfect information about γ
 iand where the profit is
net of the cost of innovation.20
Firms can choose to be active in different sectors or in the same sector: we refer
to the first situation as one of diversity, and the second as one of focus. Under focus,
both firms choose the better technology A
 . Under diversity, one firm (call it firm 1)
chooses Aand the other (call it firm 2) chooses B
  (this is a coordination game and
which firm ends up with technology Ais random). Diversity is stable if the firm
ending up with technology B
 does not want to switch to technology A
 ; otherwise the
equilibrium is focus. Conditional on this choice firms then decide to invest in order
to innovate.
Tax/subsidies affect the sectorial choice of activity of firms, for instance, they
may choose focus rather than diversity. Because the tax applies to total profits, net
of the cost of investing in order to innovate, the investment level is unaffected by
the tax rate put in place. Growth, the expected probability of innovation is therefore
influenced by the variance of taxes across sectors.
We first derive the equilibrium choices under arbitrary tax/subsidy schemes
tA   ≤ tB (“laissez-faire” being the case tA   = tB  = 0) and show the interaction
between our measure of competition φ
 and the growth rate that can be achieved via
such a tax system. We then identify the growth-maximizing tax/subsidy scheme
when the planner is subject to a budget constraint.
B. Equilibrium Profits and Innovation Intensities
Diversity.—Under diversity, firm 1is in sector Aand firm 2is in sector B, and
both firms enjoy a cost advantage over their competitors. Let e denote the representative consumer’s expense on sector A
   , p1the price charged by firm 1 ,and c fthe limit
price imposed by the competitive fringe.
The representative consumer purchases x 1A  , x fA  in order to maximize
log (x 1A   + x fA  )subject to p1 x 1A   + cf x fA    ≤ e.The solution leads to x 1A    > 0 only if
p1  ≤ cf. The consumer spends eand since firm 1’s profit is e − c1 x 1A    , firm 1 indeed
chooses the highest price (hence the lowest quantity x  1A  ) consistent with p 1  ≤ cf  ,
that is p 1  = cf. It follows that x  A = x 1A  and therefore x   A  = e/cf.
The problem is symmetric in the other sector and since the representative consumer has total income 2 , she will spend 1 on each sector, yielding x  A = x  B 
= 1/cf.
Suppose first that there is no tax/subsidy in this sector. If the firm is not a potential innovator (which happens with probability 1/2), its profit is equal to
cf  − c
	
π  DN  =  _____
cf  
 .
19

We assume without loss of generality an initial level of taxation equal to zero in each sector.
If the tax/subsidy is on the profit gross of the cost of innovation, then it will also affect the rate at which
firms innovate. A reduction in the tax rate on gross profits has a similar effect to a subsidy to the marginal cost of
innovation.
20
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If the firm in sector iis chosen to be a potential innovator, it will get a profit
c
 f  − cif it does not. Hence,
margin of c f  −  __
γi if it innovates and a profit margin of c
the ex ante expected payoff of the firm conditional on being chosen to be a potential
innovator, and upon choosing innovation intensity q, is equal to
c i
1 2
i
_
mqax
  
  q(cf  −  __
	
π  DI
i   = 
γi  ) x    + (1 − q)(cf  − c)x    −   2   q  
or
γi  − 1 i
1 2
i
_
mqax
  
  q  _____
	
π  DI
i   ≡ 
γi  
 cx    + (cf  − c)x    −   2   q    .

Using x   i  = 1/cf,the optimal probability of innovation under diversity q  iD  , and
1
the corresponding ex ante equilibrium profit π  D
i  when chosen to be a potential innovator, are respectively given by
γi   − 1 __
c
(B1)	
q iD    ≡  _____
γi    
 cf  
and
cf  − c
( q iD  )   _____
_____
	
π  DI
 
+   c   .
i    =  
f
2
2

For further use, we shall denote
γ + δ − 1 __
________
	q AD   = q  D(δ) ≡  
    c  ,
γ + δ cf
γ − δ − 1 __
	
q BD   = q  D(−δ) ≡  ________
    c    .
γ − δ cf
Overall, the ex ante expected payoff from diversifying on sector i is
1 DI
DN
_
	
π  D
i    =    (π    + π  i  ),
2
that is,
cf  − c
1  q  D  )   2  +  _____
_
	
π  D
i    =    (
cf  
 .
4 i
With a tax rate ton profits in sector i , the investment in cost reduction is still equal
to q iD  ,but the expected profit of the leading firm in sector i is
D
	
π  D
i  (t) ≡ (1 − t)π  i    .
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Focus.—Consider first the case with full Bertrand competition within each sector
(Aor B
 ). If both leading firms decide to locate in the same sector, it is optimal for
them to choose the sector with higher growth potential, i.e., sector A. Under focus,
the next best competitor for firm 1 is firm 2 rather than the fringe, so the equilibrium
price is always equal to c, which is lower than cfby assumption. Hence, in this case,
x  A  = 1/cwhile x  B  = 1/cf, since the consumer buys from the fringe in sector B.
Suppose first that there is no tax/subsidy in sector A
 . If firm 1 is chosen to be a
c
____
when it innovates, since
potential innovator, it will get a profit margin of c −  γ +
δ
it will then compete in Bertrand with the other firm and gets the full market share
1/c. If it does not innovate, it will collude with probability φin order to set a price
cfand split the demand 1 /cfwith a profit margin c f  − c; if collusion fails, the firms
make zero profit. Hence, the firm that is called to innovate solves
cf  − c __
γ+δ−1
q  2
1   _____
  
  q  ________
  
−  
   + (1 − q)φ  _
 .
	
π  FI ≡ mqax
2 cf
2
γ+δ
The optimal choice of q is then
γ+δ−1
φ cf  − c
 

   −   __   _____
(B2)	
q  F  ≡  ________
2 cf
γ+δ
and therefore

(q  F)  2 __
φ cf  − c
   .
 
+      _____
	
π  FI  =  ____
2
2 cf
If the firm is not chosen to be the innovator, it will get positive profits only if the
other firm fails and if collusion succeeds, that is, the expected profit is
φ cf  − c
 
.
	
π  FN  = (1 − q  F  )   __   _____
2 cf
Hence, the expected profit of each firm under focus in sector A is
1   π  FI  +  _
1   π  FN
	π  F  =  _
2
2

cf  − c
1 ( q  F)  2  + (2 − q  F  )   φ
__   _____
=  _
   .
4
4 cf

 	

Note that since the objective functions defining π
   FIand π
   FNare increasing in φ
   ,
F
the value functions are increasing in φ
 . Now, q   is an increasing function of δ  but
is a decreasing function of φ
  , and has zero cross-partial variation with respect to
δ, φ. It follows that
cf  − c
∂ q  F ∂ q  F 1 _____
∂ q  F ___
∂  2π  F   =  _
1   ___
       −  ___   _
    c 
,
(B3)	 ____
f
2 ∂δ ∂φ
∂δ∂φ
∂δ 4
< 0, 

implying that the cross partial between δ  and 1 − φis positive.
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If we introduce a tax rate of tin sector A
  , the probability of innovation of a firm
is still q   F, while its expected profit is
(B4)	
π  F(t) ≡ (1 − t)π  F  .
Industry Equilibrium and the Role of Taxation.—Consider the laissez-faire situation with tA   = tB  = 0. Focus will be the industry equilibrium if no firm prefers
to be active in sector B
  , the lowest profit sector, that is, when π
   F  ≥ π  D
B  . This establishes Proposition 1, which shows that there exists a cutoff value δ  F(φ) , a decreasing
function of φ,such that focus is the industry equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ δ  F(φ).
Hence, the stronger competition as measured by (1 − φ), the higher the range of
δ s for which firms will choose diversity.
Putting in place a system of tax/subsidies will modify the industry equilibrium
 )π  F , which is
since diversity arises in equilibrium only if (1 − tB)π  D
B    > (1 − tA
more difficult to achieve the larger t Bwith respect to tA. We will use as a measure of
targeting the ratio
1 − t 
(B5)	
τ ≡  _____A ,
1 − tB 
the larger τis, the higher the “tax holidays” in sector A
 with respect to sector B
 . It
should be clear that τ is sufficient to characterize the incentives of firms to choose
between diversity or focus. Alternatively, τ is a measure of the asymmetry in tax
holidays between the two sectors. Note that tax systems with τ = 1are neutral in
the sense that they do not modify the industry equilibrium since Δ(φ, 1) = δ  F(φ).
Tax policies that are targeted toward sector A
  , that is, have a higher value of τ  will
increase the likelihood of focus to be an industry equilibrium. Indeed, the industry
equilibrium is focus whenever τπ  F  > π  D
B  ; the value Δ(φ, τ)for which there is an
equality is decreasing in τ since π
   Fis increasing in δ . It follows that targeting makes
focus more likely, and establishes Corollary 1.
Hence, a larger target ratio τ increases the range of values of δ for which there
will be focus. Alternatively, if δ < δ  F(φ) , there exists a targeting tax τ  such that
δ = Δ(φ, τ); because Δ
 (φ, τ)is a decreasing function of τ  , the lower the value of
δ , the higher this value of τ should be.
Industrial Policy, Innovation, and the Level of Per Capita GDP.—Consider first
the innovation rate under diversity versus focus, and the implication of this comparison for the effect of industrial policy. Focus maximizes the innovation rate if and
only if it implies a higher innovation rate, namely whenever
	
2q  F(φ) > q  D(δ) + q  D(−δ)
γ + δ − 1 ________
γ − δ − 1 __
=  ________
 
   +  
    c    .
( γ+δ
γ − δ ) cf
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This condition is more likely to be satisfied the lower φ,i.e., the more intense the
degree of within-sector competition, and it always holds for φsufficiently small.
Whenever this condition is satisfied, but δ < δ  F(φ) , one can increase long-run
growth through a tax/subsidy policy such that δ > Δ(φ, t) .
Now consider the effects of industrial policy on the level of output (i.e., the level
of per capita GDP). If there is diversity, independently of the degree of innovation
in this sector, the price is c f, since in each sector the leading firm competes with the
fringe only: innovation decreases the cost of production but does not affect directly
the price. Therefore, output under diversity is equal to
2
(B6)	
Y  D  =  __
c   .
f

By contrast, under focus, innovation affects output directly. If there is no innovation, there is a probability φ
 that the firms collude and set a price c f , but if they fail,
the price will be equal to csince the two leaders compete in this case. If one firm
innovates, the price will be equal to c. Hence, the level of output under focus is
q  F
φ
1_____
−φ
F
__
	Y  F  =  __
c + (1 − q    )(  cf   +   c 
)
1  − φ(1 − q  F  ) _
1 __
1
=  _
c
(  c  −  c  )  .
f

Therefore moving from diversity to focus increases output (i.e., the level of per
capita GDP) by
	ΔY = 
Y  F − Y  D

cf
c
φ
F __f
__
∝  __
   c  − 1) − 1,
c  −  2 (1 − q  )(

which is larger the smaller the product φ
 (1 − q  F). Note that this difference is positive when φ = 0.
Overall, by Corollary 1, an industrial policy taking the form of a taxation on profits targeted toward sector A
  , that is, τ > 1 , will have an effect on innovation and
the level of per capita GDP, if and only if there would be diversity without targeting
and τis large enough to induce the firms to choose focus. In this case we call the
τ-industrial policy effective.
  , and therefore φ(1 − q  F)is increasing in φ. It
From (B2), q  Fis decreasing in φ
follows that industrial policy has a bigger impact on growth and output, the lower
φ: competition and industrial policy , are complements. This discussion proves
Proposition 2 in the text; an effective τ -industrial policy has a bigger effect on per
capita GDP and on innovation in more competitive industries.
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